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STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF DRIVING
WHILE INTOXICATED
I

S

making driving while intoxicated an offense are
of comparatively recent origin.' Most of them appeared
within the last twenty years, as the use of the automobile
increased.' These statutes had their genesis in two existent
difficulties. One was the difficulty of convicting an intoxicated driver under the common law. The only applicable
common-law offense was that of a public nuisance. An important element of that offense was "annoyance or injury to
the community". 3 This element was a serious limitation in
fostering public safety. A man might be driving a car while
he was thoroughly inebriated, but if he did not run someone
down or annoy the community to the extent of being a public
nuisance, no offense was committed. The common-law offense
failed to take into account the fact that unless some effective
punishment and deterrent was meted out to such a drunken
driver when no injury was done, he would be more likely to
injure someone in the future.4 One of the primary purposes
of the newer statutes was to cure this limitation.
!Theother difficulty which the more modern statutes tried
to cure, was that of convicting an intoxicated driver under
TATuTS

'The within study of these statutes and the differences in their enforcement
was made at the instance of Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia, in his drive to
mitigate the evils of drunken driving. I am also indebted to Paul Windels,
Esq., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and Oscar S. Cox, Esq.,
Chief of the Tax Division in the Corporation Counsel's office. Chief Magistrate Schurman was instrumental in distributing this study to all city magistrates, as part of the attack on this evil in New York. See also, note 68, infra.
'Some indication of the seriousness of the problem appears from a report
made by Dr. Theron W. Kilmer to the International Association of Police and
Fire Surgeons, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 24, 1935. The number of drunken
drivers in 1934 in New York State increased forty-nine times as fast as the
number of newly licensed drivers. Although there were only 1 %oper cent more
cars in the state for 1934, there were 69% more drunken motorists. Every one
of thirty states investigated, with the exception of the District of Columbia,
showed an increase in the number of intoxicated drivers.
' See State v. Rodgers, 91 N. J. L. 212, 215, 102 Atl. 433, 435 (1917).
'Gault v. State, 274 Pac. 687, 688 (Okla. 1929).
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the older statutes aimed at "intoxication in a public place."
Under these older statutes, it was generally held that one of
the elements of the offense was that the intoxication be open
and perceptible to the public.5 This, too, was a serious limitation in effectively safeguarding the public. It was a limitation based on outworn and disproved knowledge. To modern physiology, it is well known that a person's reaction time
may be sufficiently slowed up and his motor control and
coordination so affected by drinking that it will increase the
probability of his running someone down. These effects on
reaction time, motor control and coordination may take place
without being "perceptible to the public." What is important
from the standpoint of protecting the public safety is not
whether a driver looks drunk, but whether his drinking has
affected his motor control and coordination to the extent of
making it more likely that he will cause injury. The older
statutes failed to meet this condition. The modern statutes
attempted to cure this limitation requiring proof of perceptible intoxication, as well as the limitation requiring proof
of "injury to the community", by creating an offense which
consisted merely of driving "while under the influence of
intoxicating liquors," or "while in an intoxicated condition."
The New York statute provides that: 6
"Wh6ever operates a motor vehicle or motor cycle
while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."
II
In the enforcement of the New York statute, some of
the courts of this state appear to have forgotten or disregarded its purposes. While they ofttimes give lip service to
the intention and purpose of the statute, in actual practice
5 See N. Y. PiAL CODE § 1221, "Intoxication in a Public Place", N. Y.
Laws 1911, successor to N. Y. Laws 1896, c. 112, § 40, first passed by N. Y.
Laws 1857, c. 628, § 17, and included in N. Y. RIvisam STATUTES (5th ed.) pt.

1, c. XX, tit. 9, as § 18.
6N. Y. VEHICLE &

TRAFIc

LAW

§ 70 (5), first added as § 290 (3) of

N. Y. HIGHwAY LAW by N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 374.
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they require proof of either or both injury to the community,
or perceptible intoxication.7
Typical of the erroneous practice of requiring "injury to
the community" under our present statute is a recent decision, People v. Ole Jensen." The opinion in this case reads,
in part, as follows:
"The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, as a first offender, of the crime of driving an
automobile while intoxicated and sentencing him to a
term of thirty days in the County Jail * * *
"As there was no accident and no property
damage, the question here is whether this defendant
belongs at home with his family or in jail with felons.
The answer seems so obvious that no one unbitten by
the asp of fanaticism should hesitate. Liberty may be
restored to the defendant, but the stigma of six days
behind bars for an act involving no moral wrong and
no injury to any human being will linger long
.
"A man who commits his first offense of driving
an automobile while in an intoxicated condition may
be a fool, but he is not a felon in the estimation of the
generality of mankind. The extent of his foolhardiness
depends upon the man himself. Some become better
drivers, just as they become better men, under moderate stimulation. Every intelligent person knows that
many of the greatest works of art and of literature and
countless oratorical gems of the past were vastly aided,
if not inspired, by some such agency. * * *
"Judgment of conviction reversed and defendant
discharged." (Italics ours.) 9
It is difficult to list all the amazing errors in this opinion.
Admittedly, the defendant was guilty of driving while in an
intoxicated condition-the offense described in this statute.
But, the court reads into the statute the additional requirement, patently not there, that the defendant must have in'See State Dept. Reports, Vol. 45, p. 604, at 606.
8142 Misc. 340, 255 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1931).
' Similarly held in Peo. v. Betts, 142 Misc. 240, 254 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1931).
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jured someone. 10 While this question might be entirely relevant to the matter of mitigating punishment or suspending
sentence, there was no possible legal basis for the court's disregard of the plain mandate of the statute, in reversing the
I
i
conviction.
In addition, the opinion makes reference to two additional factors which seem frequently to enter into the decisions in this state, although one is irrelevant, and the other
erroneous. The courts often refer to the fact that the defendant's act "involved no moral wrong." The question involved,
is not whether it is right for a man to take a drink, or two
or three-that is beside the point-but whether it is safe for
that man to drive an automobile. The people have said
through their legislators that, irrespective of whether an accident actually happens or not, any one who drives a car
"while in an intoxicated condition" commits a misdemeanor.
Some of our lower courts apparently read that legislation
out of the books when they demand, in addition, actual injury to person or property and/or perceptible signs of intoxication-especially since all physicians, and most courts in
other states, recognize that absence of such perceptible signs
is not conclusive evidence against the existence of an intoxicated condition.
The additional error expressed in the foregoing opinion,
is the belief that liquor, before excess, may provide "moderate
stimulation" which will make a man a "better driver," as
well as a better painter or orator. This is an error shared
by many. Liquor may stimulate the flow of words and pictures, but it is well established by scientific tests that it interferes with motor control and coordination, and therefore
"Louisiana emphasizes the fact that the usual drunken driving statutes do
not require an injury, by providing in a different statute, with a heavier penalty

than usual (GEN. STATS. §§ 5292, 5293) as follows:
"Section 5292. Operating motor vehicle while intoxicated and cauing injury. It shall be unlawful for any person in an intoxicated condition. and operating a motor vehicle of any nature whatsoever, to cause
injury to person or property of another.

"Section 5293. Penalty. Any person found guilty of the violation
of the provisions of this Act may be imprisoned with or without hard
labor, for a term of not more than one year and fined in a sum not

exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)."
Similarly, CAL. PENAL Cona § 367e.
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increases the probability of accidents. An editorial in the
New York Sun, of June 25th, 1935, gives some of the figures
which show the astonishing loss of efficiency as a driver, resulting from the consumption of even small amounts of intoxicating liquor."
"In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, Curtis
Billings reported results of numerous scientific tests
which convinced him that drivers 'who have merely
been drinking as distinguished from the few who are
patently drunk,' present the 'real menace' to safety
on the highway. Various emperiments indicated that
men who had consumed al ounce and a half of alcohol
made 59.7 per cent. more errors than an equal number
who had no alcohol. The drinkers were 9.7 per cent.
slower in their mental reaction to selective speeds,
17.4 per cent. slower in muscular reaction, 35.3 per
cent. poorer in continuous concentration. A t~st devised to measure the time elapsed between getting a
signal and pressing a brake pedal showed that the
average was 37 per cent. longer for the drinkers than
for the non-drinkers.
"A pamphlet recently issued by General Motors
reports that at only 20 miles an hour the average
driver goes 22 feet before he can even start to use his
brakes; that it takes another 18 in which to stop completely. Any quantity of alcohol which slows up his
normal mental processes might conceivably contribute
to a disaster which otherwise would be avoided. * * *
"Any driver whose reflexes are below par, whose
judgment of pace and distance is clouded, is unsafe at
the wheel, a menace to every other driver on the road,
to say nothing of himself and the occupants of his own
car.
III
The various statutes establishing the offense of driving
while intoxicated may be grouped under four or five well defined types.
I Reprinted

N. Y. L. J., July 11, 1935, p. 108, "Drunken Drivers".
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Theoretically, the most inclusive type is that of Texas 12
and Maine.13 The Texas statute makes it a penal offense for
a person to drive "while such person is intoxicated, or in any
degree under the influence of intoxicating liquors"; the Maine
statute saying "when [the person is] intoxicated, or at all
under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
The next most inclusive is the form of statute which forbids operation "while intoxicated, or under the influence of
intoxicating liquors," as in Oregon,14 North Carolina,'5 and
Tennessee.'"
The next most inclusive, and the most frequent form is
the one forbidding operation of a car "while under the influence of intoxicatingliquors." Massachusetts,'7 Conneeticut,'
New Jersey,19 Georgia,0 Pennsylvania,2 ' Minnesota,2 2 Oklahomna, 23 Arizona,, 24 California,25 and Wisconsin,8 are among
the many states which have adopted this form.
The fourth type is that of New York State, where it is
a misdemeanor for a person to drive a car "while in an intoxicated condition." 27 Iowa 28 and Missouri 29 use the same
language in their statutes.
Finally, there are those states which prohibit driving
merely "when intoxicated," as in North Carolina;8" or, "while
drunk or intoxicated" as in Illinois.8'
TExAs PENAL CoDE art. 802.
MAINE MOTOR VEHICLE LAW c. 29,
14 ORE. CODE 1930, §§ 15-201.

§ 88.

N. C. CODE 1927, c. 82, Crimes and Punishments § 4506 (L. 1919, c. 234).
Ch. 55, art. 7, The Motor Vehicle Act § 2621 (44) (L. 1927, c. 148, § 2).
I Tenn. Acts 1917, c. 21, § 1.
2 MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 90, § 24.
CoN.N. GEN. STAT. c. 82, tit. 112, § 1785.
"N. J. Laws 1931, c. 171, § 14 (3).
'GA. CODE (1933) § 68.
' PA. VEHICLES LAW tit. 75, § 231.
- Minn. Laws 1927, c. 412, § 2.
'Okla. Laws 1923, § 3, Sen. Bill No. 25, c. 16.
'Ariz. Laws 4th Spec. Sess. 1927, c. 2 (6), par. 1.
'CAL. HIGHWAY LAW § 112.
I Wis. VEHICLE OPERATiON ACT §§ 6362-5.
IN. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAIc LAW § 70 (5).
IOWA CODE, Motor Vehcles, § 5027.

SMo. REv. STATS. § 7783.
N. C. CODE 1927, c. 55, MOTOR VEHICLE art. 4, § 2614 (L. 1917, c. 140, § 13)
superseded by sections set out in note 15, supra; see also ONTARIO, REv. STATS.
1927, §45 (1), (2).
SILr.. Rzv. STAT. (1931) c. 121, § 242.
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Great Britain words its statute somewhat differently by
prohibiting driving by a person "under the influence of drink
* * * to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper
control of the vehicle." 32
These slightly variant descriptions are, by some decisions, supposed to demand the existence of different degrees
of intoxication to bring an offender within the statute. 3
Other decisions, however, say that they are to all practical
purposes, the same 83a
But the exact wording of the statutes is not the most significant factor in their enforcement. The interpretation of
each statute depends very greatly upon the temper and attitude of the court. In practically all the states, as well as in
Great Britain, the application of the statute to hold the defendant is more uniform and more exacting than in New
York. It cannot be considered without significance that of
the scores of cases examined in the other states of the
Union dealing with these statutes, no matter how worded, all
but two or three affirmed the convictions below, while of the
three New York cases cited herein, under our similar statute,
all three were reversals of convictions below.
The difference in the temper and attitude of the courts
of other states as compared with ours is also readily apparent
from decisions such as the following. In State v. Rodgers,3 4
the New Jersey Court held as follows:
"It will be noticed that it is not essential to the
existence of the statutory offense that the driver of
the automobile should be so intoxicated that he cannot
safely drive a car. The expression, 'under the influence
of intoxicating liquor,' covers not only all the well
known and easily recognized conditions and degrees
of intoxication, but any abnormal mental or physical
condition which is the result of indulging in any degree in intoxicating liquors, and which tends to deprive
C~inry, STATS., Road Traffic Act, 15 [1].
Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 250 Mass. 555, 146 N. E. 18 (1925); see
Wilson v. State, 59 S.W. (2d) 399 (Tex. 1933).
' See People v. Dingle, 205 Pac. 705, 708 (Cal. 1922) ; People v. Lewis,
37 P. (2d) 752, 753 (Cal. 1934); State v. Noble, 250 Pac. 833, 834 (Ore.
1926); Williams v. State, 271 S.W. 628, 629 (Tex. 1925).
'91 N. J. L. 212, 215, 102 Atl. 433, 435 (1917).
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him of that clearness of intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess. So, one driving an automobile upon a public street while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor offends against the
Disorderly Persons Act, even though he drives so
slowly and so skillfully and carefully that the public
is not annoyed or endangered * * *." 35
A similar clear understanding, that the common-law requirement of actual or imminent injury to person or property
is not necessary to make out the simple statutory offense, appears in the decision of Commonwealth v. Lyseth.3
"BiRALEY, J. The defendant having been tried
and convicted on a complaint under G. L. c. 90, § 24,
for operating an automobile while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, contends, that the trial judge
erroneously refused to give the following request as
framed: 'The defendant cannot be found guilty of
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
unless the jury find that he was actually driving in a
manner different from the way he would have driven
had he taken no intoxicating liquor.' * * *
"The Commonwealth was not required to prove
that the defendant was drunk. 'Whatever difficulties
there may be in framing * * * a definition of the extent of inebriety which falls short of and which constitutes drunkenness, there is a distinction between
that crime on the one hand and merely being under
the influence of liquor on the other hand, which is recognized in common speech, in ordinary experience, and
in judicial decisions! Cutter v. (ooper, 234 Mass.
307, 317, 318, 125 N. E. 634, 637. The statute is penal.
Its very purpose is to regulate the use of motor vehicles on the public ways, in the interests of the public
welfare. See Tripp v. Allen, 226 Mass. 189, 115 N. E.
Peo. v. McGrath, 271 Pac. 549, 550 (Cal. 1928) (Court pointed out the
offense could be committed even though there are no other travellers on the
highway at the time.). See also, Stewart v. State, 299 S. W. 646, 647 (Tex.

1927).
1250 Mass. 555, 146 N. E. 18 (1925).
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255. It was wholly immaterial whether the defendant
exercised due care to avoid injury to other travelers,
and he could be convicted even if there were no travelers on the street. Commonwealth v. Horsfall, 213
Mass. 232, 235, 100 N. E. 362, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 682.
"We perceive no reason why the statute should
not be construedin accordancewith its plain meaning,
and the entry must be
"Exceptions overruled." (Italics ours.)
In further support of the fact that the exact language of
the statute seems not to be the controlling factor, is the decision in Hasten v. State, 37 where the court said:
"The second and third assignments of error go to
the question of what extent of influence of liquor is
required to justify a conviction under our statute.
"[2] It is appellant's claim that this means in
effect 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor to the
extent of impairing to an appreciable degree his ability to operate his car in the manner that an ordinarily
prudent and cautious man, in the full possession of
his faculties and using reasonable care, would operate
a similar vehicle under similar conditions.' It is the
contention of the state, on the other hand, that the law
means 'any influence of intoxicating liquor, however
slight,' and the trial court instructed the jury on this
latter theory. * * *
"It is a truism that a person who is even to the
slightest extent 'under the influence of liquor' in the
common and well-understood acception of the term, is
to some degree at least less able, either mentally or
physically or both, to exercise the clear judgment and
steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with
safety to himself and the public. With the increasing
number and speed of automobiles on our highways,
and the appalling number of accidents resulting there'280 Pac. 670 (Ariz. 1929).
influence of intoxicating liquors."

The Arizona statute reads "while under the
Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. 1927, c. 2 (6), par. 1.
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from, it is not strange that the lawmaking power determined that any person, who of his own free will
voluntarily lessened in the slightest degree his ability
to handle such vehicles by the use of intoxicating
liquor, should, while in such condition, be debarred
from their use. The Legislature has placed no limitation on the extent of the influence required, nor can
we add to their language. * * *.
"The judgment of the trial court is affirmed."
Iowa has a statute similar to that of New York ("while
in an intoxicated condition").38 The case of State v. Giles,3
shows the difference in the attitude toward enforcement of
the same statute:
"Two grounds for reversal are presented: (1)
That the conviction is not sustained by the evidence;
(2) that the punishment was excessive.
"We cannot say that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the conviction. Whether the evidence was
such as to justify the maximum sentence is a question
not free from perplexity. The very nature of the offense in its most mitigated form involves so much of
danger to human life as to call for severe punishment. * * * He (the defendant) was driving at the
rate of from 20 to 35 miles an hour, and passed three
cars as he approached the toll-house. The street in
that vicinity was congested with traffic. The defendant had sufficient control of his car to avoid all contact with other vehicles. There was no accident of
any kind. The degree of his intoxication,is much in
dispute in the evidence. The man in charge of the
filling station saw no signs of intoxication upon him.
Bankenship, who rode with him saw none. Another
witness who talked with him saw none. He had no
liquor upon his person, or in his car, though witnesses
testified that they could smell intoxicating liquor upon
his breath.
IOWA CODE,

§70 (5).

Motor Vehicles § 5027; N. Y.

'206 N. W. 133 (Iowa 1925).
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"[1, 2] Granting, therefore, that the circumstances attending his particular offense were not aggravating
in the sense in which the term is used in relation to
public offenses, yet the fact remains that the nature
of the offense itself is such that aggravation inheres
in it. The peril threatened by such an offense is so
great and so imminent that only severe punishment
can be deemed adequate to restrain it. * **
"The judgment is accordingly affirmed." (Italics
ours.)

The comparison of this decision, with the decision on
practically identical facts, in the New York case of Peo. v.
Jense, 40 discussed supra, throws into relief the differences
in application of these same statutes.
If should be noted that the group of cases here discussed,
which define intoxication, beginning with State v. Rodgers,
supra, through People v. Dingle, infra, are all leading cases,
which have been.continuously cited, not only in their respective states, but all over the country.
In People v. Dingle,41 the court held as follows:
"Complaint is made of the following instruction:
'The court instructs you that under this section it is not necessary that the person should be socalled "dead-drunk" or hopelessly intoxicated, but if
you shall be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt,
from the evidence in the case, that the defendant, was
in such a condition from the use of intoxicating liquors
that it so affected his acts or conduct, or movements,
that the public or persons coming in contact with him
could readily see and know that it was affecting him
in this respect, and was reflected in his walk, acts, and
conversation, and, if you shall find from the evidence
in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these con*
*

ditions resulted from the use of intoxicating liquors

and that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle
upon a public highway in the county of Orange, when
4 142 Misc. 340, 255 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1931).
'205 Pac. 705, 708 (Cal. 1922).
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in such condition, then the defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning
of the statute and you should find him guilty as
charged.' * * *.
"* * * the instructionwas, if anything, too favorable to defendant. A person may be so far under the
influence of intoxicating liquor that, to an appreciable
degree, there is an impairment of his ability to operate his automobile in the manner that an ordinarily
prudent and cautious person, in the full possession of
his faculties, would operate a similar vehicle under
like conditions; and yet the person whose ability to
operate his car is thus impaired might not be so drunk
that the public, or persons coming in contact with him,
could 'readily' see and know that intoxicating liquor
was affecting his acts or conduct and was being reflected in his walk and conversation. The drink may
have impaired his ability to drive his car properly by
imparting to him a dash of dangerous recklessness,
without in any wise manifesting itself in his speech,
or in his walk, or be noticeable in his intellectual
processes. We find no prejudicial error in this instruction. * * *
"The judgment is affirmed."
IV
We find here in the expression of the California courts
'a dash of dangerous recklessness" used as a matter of legal
analysis, a characterization which, interestingly enough, is
42
strikingly similar to that made by Dr. Alexander 0. Gettler
as a matter of scientific analysis. Dr. Gettler has made exhaustive studies of the relation between the percentage of
alcohol found in the brain and the intoxicated condition, or
lack of it, in the subject. The following table presents that
relationship between the alcoholic content of the brain and
the physiologic effects: 43
2 Toxicologist

of the City of New York.

GETTLER AND

TIBER,

THE

ALCOHOLIC

CONTENT

OF

THE

HUMAN

BRAIN (ITs RELATION TO INTOXICATION) p. 6, reprinted from The Archives of
Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Feb., 1927, vol. 3, pp. 218-226.
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"Table 3-Classification of Alcohol Cases
Classification
Trace

+
+ +

Percentage of
Alcohol in Brain

Physiologic Effect

0.005-0.02
0.02 -0.10
0.10 -0.25

Normal
Normal
Loss of sense of care; ag-

-

+-+-+

0.25 -0.40

+ + ++

0.40 -0.60

gressive

Loss of equilibrium; intoxicated
Unbalanced; intoxicated"
(Italics ours.)

In a bulletin issued by the New York Academy of Medicine, entitled "A Study of the Alcoholic Content of Autopsy
Material, and Its b earing On the Cause of Death," Dr. Gettler, after setting out the foregoing table, continues as follows (pp. 723, 724).:
"Now as to effect. With a trace of alcohol the
person looks normal, walks around normally and acts
normal. Therefore one plus cases look normal. Two
plus cases do not look intoxicated. Some have, however, lost their sense of care. They are a little aggressive--the modern hooch especially makes one aggressive. In the three plus cases there was a loss of equilibrium (intoxication) and the four plus cases were in
the same condition, only they were almost helpless.
They were so badly affected that they could hardly
walk. So by the amount of the alcohol in the brain we
can now say that we have an index for telling whether
a person is intoxicated or not.
"Against this many people bring forth the same
question that is repeatedly asked of me in court, 'Well,
doctor, isn't it a fact that I can give the same amount
of alcohol to two people, and one may become intoxicated and the other not?'
"My answer to that is: We are not analyzing
what the man gets to drink. We are not analyzing
what the man has in his stomach. We are not analyz-
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ing what the man has in his intestines. We are analyzing for the alcoholic contents of the brain.
"There is a difference between how much alcohol
is in the brain, and how much did he drink, or how
much is in his stomach. The amount in his stomach
does not affect the brain. The alcohol in the intestines does not affect the brain. Once it gets to the
brain, it has an effect and that effect is proportionate
to the amount present."
Dr. Gettler continues, in his pamphlet, to say that the
reason why less of the total amount of alcohol drunk, gets
to the brain in habitues, than in abstainers, is that all the
tissues and organs of habitues have acquired an oxidizing
power, absent in abstainers, which burns up a good part of
the alcohol before it gets to the brain, but once a certain
44
quantity gets there, the effect is the same.
"It is true, however, that the same amount of alcohol consumed will affect different persons to a different degree. This, one must remember, is alcohol
consumed, and not the quantity of alcohol present in
the brain. In those who have a greater tolerance, the
power to oxidize alcohol rapidly has been developed
to a high degree. They can partake of much more
alcohol and show less effect because they destroy it
much more quickly. Because of this more rapid oxidation, much of the alcohol consumed is destroyed,
and hence it does not accumulate in the brain. The
alcohol present in the brain is not proportional to the
amount consumed in different persons, because the
processes of oxidation in the cells vary. The part of
the alcohol, however, which escapes oxidation and
hence accumulates in the brain has its effect, and it
matters little as to what the alcoholic habits of the
person have been."
Dr. Gettler also conducted experiments on the relation"Id. at 8. See also G=ETRm
& FREICH, The Nature of Alcohol Tolerance in AmERICAx JouRxAL OF SuRGERY (1935).
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ship between the alcohol content of the brain and the alcohol
content of the spinal fluid.4 5 His pertinent conclusions are:
(1) The alcohol content of the spinal fluid is always
somewhat higher than that of the brain. There
is, however, a definite and regular relation between the alcohol content of the brain and spinal
fluid.
(2) All cases having 0.265 per cent. or more of alcohol in the spinal fluid were intoxicated. This
corroborates the findings of Gettler and Tiber
that individuals with an alcohol content in the
brain of over 0.25 per cent. were intoxicated.
Dr. Gettler believes that the two plus people (meaning
those in whose brains there has accumulated from .10 to 0.25
per cent. of alcohol, or from 0.12 to 0.265 per cent. alcoholic
content of the spinal fluid) although not what could be described as "drunk" or "intoxicated" like the three plus and
the four plus, are certainly "under the influence of intoxicating liquor," or "in an intoxicated condition"; and are not
in a fit condition to drive a car safely, even though there are
no visible signs of intoxication.
The question is, how can that be determined? The rule
in our courts is that witnesses may express their opinion as
to the condition of intoxication or sobriety of the defendant,
as well as describe all the circumstances which led them to
form this conclusion.4 6 It is difficult enough, however, even
in the three plus case, to obtain conclusive proof by inspection of the defendant, when arrested, since the witnesses almost invariably differ. Those in the defendant's car usually
swear that the defendant showed no signs of liquor drinking,
as against the policeman's and bystanders' testimony that he
did. 7 In the two plus stage, almost equally dangerous, and
'GEnria & FREmREIci, Determinatiom of Alcohwlic Intoxication During
Life by Spinal Fluid Analysis in XCII JOURNAL OF BIoLOGICAL CHEMiSTRY

(July, 1931).
,"People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 (1856) ; Pamphlet, "Intoxication, How
Proved," by Magistrate Frederick B. House.
" Stewart v. State, 299 S. W. 646, 647 (Tex. 1927) ; Nunn v. State, (1929,
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.) 26 S. W. (2d) 648 (Tex. 1929).
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signs
scientifically determined to give no readily perceptible
48
of imbibition, the problem becomes more acute.
The answer to the problem is not only a complete and
immediate examination by a physician, 4 9 rather than trusting to the observation of laymen, but in addition, either a
spinal fluid, blood or urine analysis, to show actual content
of these body fluids. Dr. Gettler's experiments have shown
that the brain gives the most reliable results in tests for alcohol content, with the spinal fluid practically as good. The
former can be made, however, only on a dead patient; the
latter, although it can be applied to the living by a spinal
tap, may leave the subject temporarily incapacitated. For
the present, therefore, the brain and spinal fluid tests seem
impractical in drunken driving cases.
The remaining possibilities are, therefore, either to test
the blood or the urine. Both tests have their staunch supporters. Although Dr. Gettler does not believe that either
is as accurate as the brain or spinal fluid analysis, both
methods are in actual use at the present time, and apparently
are proving reasonably satisfactory. The blood test is being
used in Europe, in cities like Oslo, Hamburg and Berlin."
" People v. McIntire, 292 Pac. 675, 677 (Cal. 1930) ; State v. Johnson, 287
Pac. 909, 911 (Utah 1930). In both of these cases, where the defendants ran
over and killed their victims, it was held that the evidence of drinking was
insufficient, since there were no perceptible signs of the "influence". However, it
is only where these signs become gross, that there can be little difference of opinion, as in People v. Fellows, 34 P. (2d) 177 (Cal. 1934), where conviction was
had. The court pointed out, at 178, that "from the time he alighted from his car
to his incarceration, a period of more than two hours, he could not stand or walk
without staggering; that his speech was thickened to such a degree that he could
not articulate clearly."
"A police surgeon, as now arranged in New York City, makes an examination. The former "Examination of Prisoner charged with driving while
Intoxicated" by the police, is almost pitiably inadequate. The blanks on the
report, entitled as above, provide, among others, for answers to these questions.
"Is he able to stand without aid," "Is he able to stoop without staggering,"
'Staggering gait on walking straight line," "Any other unusual condition,"
"Speech," "Thickened and slurred," "Loud and boisterous," "Blasphemous or
abusive," etc. All of these are tests for the drunken man, not for the slightly
intoxicated one, who is the more dangerous, because more likely to be at a
wheel than the visibly drunken one. Note the descriptive language of Magistrate Sweeney, in convicting four out of six drunken drivers, N. Y. Sun,
March 13, 1936. "A man too drunk to stand is not likely to be at the wheel of
an automobile. It is the fellow whose ego and aggressiveness are accentuated
who is causing all the trouble. Certainly when you go bumping into police cars
it is an indication of accentuated ego."
' Editorial, "Blood Will Tell," N. Y. Times, May 16, 1935.
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The urine analysis is being used in England,5 1 and in Milwaukee by Dr. Herman A. Heise.52
The urine analysis seems preferable to the blood test,
because involving no possibility of infection, or objection on
the part of the defendant to the puncturing of the skin.
It is true that the urine test may not be in every instance
completely conclusive, on the score of the degree of intoxication. But, on the other hand, there is the following to recommend it. If the defendant is correct in his contention that
he has not taken a single drink, but is ill or nervous-the
usual claim-the urine test will conclusively demonstrate the
truth or falsity of such a claim. If there is no alcohol content in this body fluid, he is telling the truth, and has been
given the benefit of an impartial and scientific test which
can serve completely to exonerate him.
On the other hand, if, as the prosecution claims, he has
been imbibing, the urine test, based on the established figures
of minimum percentages of alcohol present, above which
some intoxication must be found to exist (of. Dr. Gettler's
table, similar ones have been worked out for the urine tests),
is an important corroborative element, of very gTeat value
to confirm inspectionary evidence (alcoholic breath, uncertain gait, thick speech, etc.). It is of even greater value when
the obvious and perceptible signs are not present, as in the
earlier stages of an "intoxicated condition," the two plus of
Dr. Gettler's table-the class described in the California decision, People v. Dingle, supra, as having acquired "a dash
of dangerous iecklessness."
A similar type of test, not conclusive but rather one of
exclusion, is now being applied in the blood paternity tests
of the recently passed Breitbart-Esquirol bills.58 These tests
will not show conclusively that a man is the father of a child,
but they will show either (1) that he is of a different blood
"Tests of Drunkenness in Motor Accidents," Law Times, Jan. 8, 1928,

Vol. 165, p. 84.
1 "Alcohol and Automobile Accidents," Paper read before the American
Medical Association, June 13, 1934.
' N. Y. Laws 1935, cc. 196, 197, 198 as amended by N. Y. Laws 1936,
cc. 439, 440. For a scholarly discussion of this law and its application, see
Matter of Swahn, 158 Misc. 17, 285 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1936). Also, Flippen
v. Meinhold, 156 Misc. 451, 282 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1935); Matter of Lentz,
247 App. Div. 31, 282 N. Y. Supp. 49 (2d Dept. 1935).
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group, so that he cannot be the father, or (2) that he is of a
related blood group, so that he may be the father."4 The
urine test here suggested for drunkenness can be at least as
helpful as'these blood paternity tests.
It is believed that the suggested urine analysis does not
come within the prohibition of Article 1, Section 6 of the
New York State Constitution, privileging against selfincrimination. 5 5 Fingerprinting, before conviction, is actually done every day in the week, and a decision holding it
self-incriminatory has been disregarded. 56 Note, also, the
examination for venereal infection, constantly availed of
under Section 343-m et seq., of the Public Health Law.5 7
Also, the Court of Appeals has held that "a prisoner
may be examined for marks and bruises, and then they may
be proved upon his trial to establish his guilt" and that the
constitutional privilege is against any compulsion to testify
orally, or by written words, and not otherwise.5 8 Nor is
there any professional privilege involved in such examinations, which would prevent the physician from thereafter
59
testifying.
V
The language of the leading case in New York is sufficiently broad to make possible convictions, just as in the
other states, where the defendant's capacity to drive is impaired to any extent, nor does the intoxication have to be
perceptible. One of the principal problems is to get our lower
The amendment by N. Y. Laws 1936, cc. 439, 440 makes the result of
the test admissible in evidence only if exclusion of parentage is shown. See
editorial, N. J. L. J., Oct. 29, 1935, Vol. 94, p. 1542.
" See discussion, "Tests of Drunkenness in -Motor Accidents," L. T.,
Jan. 8, 1928. Note, also, People v. Decker, 156 Misc. 156, 282 N. Y. Supp. 176
(1935), where the court evaded the question of a claimed infringement of rights
under the New York Constitution, because of a physical examination for
drunkenness, on the ground that the record did not show the fact of such an
examination.
aN. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 552a; Peo. v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 412 (1926); see also Peo. v. Dennis, 132 Misc. 410, 413, 230 N. Y. Supp.
510, 515 (1928), aff'd, 225 App. Div. 785 (4th Dept. 1928).
Peo. v. Johnson, 252 N. Y. 387, 391, 169 N. E. 619 (1930).
Peo. v. Von Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 195, 67 N. E. 299, 301 (1903).
cPeo. v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446, 452, 93 N. E. 57, 59 (1910).
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courts to apply the standard suggested in this leading case of
People v. Weaver,"° as follows:

"So in the statute under which the defendant has
been convicted, the meaning of the term clearly is that
one shall not be affected by alcoholic beverage to such
an extent as to impair his judgment or his ability to
operate an automobile. We may adopt the rule suggested by the learned district attorney in his brief in
this case as follows: 'Hence for the purposes of the
statute under which defendant is convicted, he is intoxicated when he has imbibed enough liquor to render him incapable of giving that attention and care
to the operation of his automobile that a man of prudence and reasonable intelligence would give.'

The

difficulty is that the learned judge did not limit the
jury to that rule. It may be difficult to draw the line
between sobriety and intoxication. Because of such
difficulty it may generally be proper to permit the jury
to draw that line, but we think the jury should at least
have been instructed that intoxication within the
meaning of this statute means such a condition as
impairs to some extent, however slight it may be, the

ability of a person to operate an automobile."

(Italics

ours.) 61

188 App. Div. 395, 400, 177 N. Y. Supp. 71, 74 (3d Dept. 1919).
'In State v. Graham, 222 N. W. 909, 911 (Minn. 1929), there is an illumi-

nating discussion of the claim that the crime is too vaguely defined by the
statutes to be constitutionally valid.
"The constitutionality and validity of the laws is questioned. It is
urged that it is invalid because of uncertainty and because it in no manner
defines or limits the term 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' * * *
"The act of 1927 * * * substituted the words 'under the influence of
intoxicating liquor' in place of the words 'in an intoxicated condition.'
The statute is a police regulation. The original appears to be section 21,
c. 365, Laws of 1911, and, so far as appears, has stood unchallenged. The
primary purpose of the law is to advance the safety of travel on public
highways. The expression 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' is
in common, everyday use by the people. It is older than this law. When
used in reference to the driver of a vehicle on the public highways, it
appears to have a well-understood meaning. The trial court, in the case
of Elkin v. Buschner (Pa.) 16 A. 102, in discussing the question as to
when a man is intoxicated, used this language in instructing the jury:
'Whenever a man is under the influence of liquor so as not to be entirely
at himself, he is intoxicated; although he can walk straight, although he
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Certainly, the man who drives "with a dash of dangerous recklessness," as in the language of the California court,
or with "a loss of sense of care, aggressiveness," as it is described in Dr. Gettler's medical study, is "incapable of giving that attention and care to the operation of his automobile that a man of prudenee and reasonableintelligencewould
give."6 2 Both the California court and Dr. Gettler are agreed
that at this stage (the two plus), although it shows in the
body (brain) as between 0.10 to 0.25 per cent. of alcohol,
there are no outward symptoms of intoxication visible to the
eye. This seriously impairs the validity of the ancient and
widespread myth, that some liquor, even if not a lot, may
make a man "a better driver." The symptoms discovered by
Dr. Gettler, as the result of hundreds of tests, which accrue
from drinks long before any real drunkenness is present, is
described by him as "the loss of sense of care, aggressiveness"
(the same thing as the "buoyancy or elation perceptible only
to himself and not discernible by another" of People v.
Weaver, 3 or "the dash of dangerous recklessness" of People
v. Dingle 64). Such immediate product of the first drinksadmittedly what most people take those drinks for-may be
excellent preparation for going into battle, but it is certainly
the opposite for sitting at the wheel of a car, since it converts that car from a vehicle into a weapon.6 5 That is exactly
what Section 70, subdivision 5, of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
of this state aims to prevent.
VI
In support of the statement herein that although our
law itself is practically the same as those in force in the rest
may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible

signs to the casual observer that he is drunk, yet if he is under the
influence of liquor so as not to be at himself, so as to be excited from it,
and not to possess that clearness of intellect and that control of himself
that he otherwise would have, he is intoxicated."
The Elkin v. Buschner definition has also been widely used in-the courts of
many states.
IPeo. v. Weaver, 188 App. Div. 395, 177 N. Y. Supp. 71 (3d Dept. 1919).
1Id. at 400, 177 N. Y. Supp. at 74.
'205 Pac. 705, 703 (Cal. 1922).
Commonwealth v. Gorman, 192 N. E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1934) ; Trebeck v.
Crondace, 1 K. B. 158, 166 (1918).
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of the country, yet it has not been applied as stringently to
effectuate its -purpose, are the following figures, which show
the percentages of convictions, compared with arrests for
drunken driving, in states other than ours. Figures obtained
on a preliminary examination of statistics of conviction were
as follows: 6
OFFENSE-DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF LIQUOR.
Percentage
Arrests
Convictions
of Convictions
to Arrests

Connecticut
1932
1933
1934
Massachusetts
1933
1934
California
1933
1934

1316
1288
1565

792
720
896

60-1.5%
57%
57-1/4%

584
976

429
745

73-1/4%
75-1/3%

2237
2880

1995
2256

89-1/5%
78-1/3%

The percentage of convictions to arrests, for the similar
offense, in New York City, for the last three months of 1934,
was 20%, and for the first four months of 1935, was 21%,
although usually approximately 30%. It seems highly significant that three states, chosen at random, should show a
percentage'of conviction, of approximately between 60 and
90%, as compared with the New York percentage of 20 to

30%.
A more complete examination fully confirms this premise. The figure for the percentage of convictions to arrests
for the offense of driving while under the influence of liquor
for all states, with the exception of Iowa, North Carolina,
Ohio, Vermont and Wisconsin is 69.22o.67 It speaks for it"CONNECTICUT MOTOR VEHICLE STATISTICS-FOR 1932, 1933, 1934; ANNUAL
REPORTS, 1933, 1934, Massachusetts, Commissioner of Public Safety; CALIFORNIA MOTOR VEHICLE STATISTICS, 1933, 1934.
1 STATISTICS OF COURTS OF GENERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN SELECTED
STATES, Department of Commerce, Bureau of The Census (1932). Iowa's percentage of conviction is 78.77o; North Carolina's, 60.89o; Ohio's, 68.67;
Vermont's, 82.9%; Wisconsin's, 81.4%.
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self, in comparison to the figure for New York of 20% to

-VI'
SUMMARY AND REC0OMMENDATIONS

The conditions which led to the passage of the statutes
penalizing driving while intoxicated, were the difficulty in
obtaining convictions for a public nuisance at common law,
since an "annoyance or injury to the community" had to be
shown and the equal difficulty of obtaining convictions under
statutes penalizing "intoxication in a public place," since the
intoxication had to be offensively perceptible.
Under statutes substantially similar all over the country,
most of the other states have interpreted their statutes to accomplish their purpose, namely, to prevent one who is at all
under the influence of liquor from driving a car, even if there
does not actually result the injury which the situation invites, and even if the intoxication is not offensively perceptible, since both by scientific test and every-day human experience, there is a recognized impairment of driving ability
before the perceptibly intoxicated stage.
The language of the leading case in this state, People v.
Weaver,1 is broad enough to make it possible for this state
to apply the same standards as are applied in other states.
Nevertheless, the usual percentage of convictions in our lower
courts (20 to 30% ), as compared with the percentage of convictions in other states (69.2%o), is so low as to make it apparent that our courts are more reluctant to convict than are
the courts of other states.
It may also be that the apparently greater insistence
here, on the two unnecessary prerequisites of actual injury
to someone or perceptible intoxication, often reflect the difficulties felt by our magistrates in deciding on the conflicting
' In confirmation of the premise here discussed, that our law is the same
as in the rest of the country but needs stricter enforcement, is the announce-

ment made recently by Chief Magistrate Schurman, that as a result of the
campaign of enforcement, of which this study was a part, the percentage of
convictions to arrests, for drunken driving in New York, has recently approached
the average for the rest of the country. N. Y. Sun, Dec. 15, 1936.

188 App. Div. 395, 177 N. Y. Supp. 71 (3d Dept. 1919).
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evidence presented to them. This opinion evidence is inconclusive enough, even when the defendant has reached the
more obvious stages of intoxication; it is certainly hopelessly
inadequate in the earlier stages. If that difficulty of proof
could be resolved by some simple test, the situation could be
very much clarified, since, as stated, the discussion in People
v. Weaver is ample to include the non-perceptible stages, as
well as the more obvious ones.
The urine analysis now used in England and in Milwaukee, while not completely conclusive in every instance,
would be of very great value, since it would be completely
exculpatory of a defendant who had had no liquor, and could
be an important corroborative factor, completing and confirming the other evidence, in situations where the defendant
had imbibed liquor. It is to be preferred to the blood or
spinal fluid analysis since it can be more easily accomplished
by police regulation and added to the police surgeons' examination, as now arranged for, and would not need the legislation that a blood or spinal fluid test might, since the latter
involve an operation, although slight. The English have had
little difficulty in persuading voluntary compliance with a
urine test, after explanation of its purpose, and that its effect
will be completely exculpatory if no liquor has been taken,
as claimed. 70
It is, therefore, recommended:
1. That a urine analysis be made a part of every examination, as now arranged for by a police surgeon, of a defendant charged with driving while in an intoxicated condition; and that additional technicians be assigned to do this
testing.
2. That magistrates be urged to apply the present statute more fairly and adequately, and in complete compliance
with People v. Weaver.71 There is no basis in law for reading
into the statute, requirements based (1) on common-law nuisance charges (actual injury to someone), or (2) on statu"' "Tests of Drunkenness in Motor Accidents," L. T., Jan. 8, 1928, Vol.
165, p. 84.
188 App. Div. 395, 177 N. Y. Supp. 71 (3d Dept. 1919).
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tory charges of "intoxication in a public place" (perceptible
drunkenness). Neither of these have any place in the simple
requirements of our statute penalizing "driving while in an
intoxicated condition." Decisions like those in People v.
2 and
Jensem7
People v. Betts, 73 are not justified by the law.
3. That pleas of guilty to the charge of disorderly conduct, with its lesser penalties and no danger of loss of license,
should not be accepted as an alternative to standing trial on
the charge of driving "while in an intoxicated condition."
All the foregoing can be accomplished without any legislative changes, and should result in making a living statute
out of what has been in the past practically a dead one.
FRANCES WILLIAMSON LEHRICH.

New York City.

'142 Misc. 340, 255 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1931).
',3142 Misc. 240, 254 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1931).

